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V.

Enhancing Constitutional Venue Protections in
Criminal Conspiracy Cases: A Proposed New
Judicial Standard
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
One century ago this year, the Supreme Court held in
Hyde v. United States that venue in a federal conspiracy case
lies in any district in which one or more overt acts occurred.1
In a 5–4 decision over the impassioned dissent of Justice
Holmes, who attacked the holding as diminishing an
important constitutional right, the Court established an
expansive interpretation of venue in conspiracy cases that
The majority opinion in Hyde
has held to this day.2
recognized that “to extend the jurisdiction of conspiracy by
overt acts may give to the government a power which may be
abused . . . .”3 Nonetheless, the Court held that a broad
interpretation of venue was necessary to effectively prosecute
multi-district conspiracies.4 As the Hyde majority predicted,
its ruling has helped enable government prosecutions of large
numbers of defendants charged with far-flung organized
crime and other conspiracies at mass trials the Framers could
probably not have predicted.5
Justice Holmes’ dissent was equally prescient. Noting
that the Court’s jurisdiction now spanned the entire
continent,
Holmes
examined
numerous
potential
1. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 363 (1912).
2. Id. at 391, 363.
3. Id.
4. See id. (“We must not, in too great a solicitude for the criminal, give him
a kind of immunity from punishment . . . . And this may result if the rule
contended for be adopted. Let him meet with his fellows in secret, and he will
try to do so; let the place be concealed, as it can be, and he and they may
execute their crime in every state in the Union and defeat punishment in all.”).
5. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 1924)
(affirming Prohibition Act convictions of forty-two of sixty-three defendants);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 393 (1927) (affirming
convictions of twenty individuals and twenty-three corporations for violating the
Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 315 U.S.C. §§ 1–7));
United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1939) (affirming conviction of
one defendant and reversing conviction of another in an eighty-eight-defendant
narcotics prosecution); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 116 (6th Cir.
1956) (affirming convictions of fourteen defendants in a twenty-defendant
narcotics prosecution); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 passim (5th Cir.
1981) (affirming convictions of fifteen of twenty-three indicted RICO
defendants).
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ramifications of the Court’s holding, at one point describing
the majority’s reasoning as “an amazing extension of even the
broadest form of fiction.”6 Holmes observed that this fiction
allowed for prosecution in a district in which the defendants
had never come “within a thousand miles,” and he posited
that “it might be at the choice of the government to prosecute
in any one of twenty states in none of which the conspirators
had been.”7
As Holmes predicted, Hyde has enabled the government
to prosecute criminal conspiracy cases in districts that have
only the most tenuous connection to the alleged conduct and
no connection to the particular defendants on trial. One can
only wonder how Justice Holmes would have reacted to the
Eleventh Circuit’s panel decision in United States v. Shearer,
a drug conspiracy case.8 In Shearer, venue was found to
properly lie in the Middle District of Florida, even though its
only connection to the crime was the inference that coconspirators not on trial and not even testifying as witnesses
must have passed through that district, because two drove
and one flew from the Miami area to New Orleans.9
This Article argues that the Hyde standard for venue in
federal criminal conspiracy cases provides insufficient
safeguards for defendants who seek to assert their
constitutional venue rights. The Hyde standard for venue,
broad in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, has become
even broader in recent decades as courts have expanded the
scope of what can constitute an “overt act” in furtherance of a
conspiracy.10 Federal courts should modify the common law
of venue by granting defense motions to transfer cases from
districts that have no significant connection to the alleged
criminal conspiracy. This evolution of the common law would
provide a needed counter-balance to the common law’s
expansion in recent decades of what can constitute an overt
act in furtherance of a conspiracy.
Absent such a
countervailing change in the common law, venue—a
safeguard that appears not once but twice in the
Constitution—will remain essentially meaningless in
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Hyde, 225 U.S. at 389 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 386, 389.
United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.
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conspiracy cases.
Part II of this Article describes the Constitution’s venue
protections, and Part III discusses the Hyde opinion. Part IV,
discusses the expansion in recent decades of what can
constitute an “overt act” in furtherance of a conspiracy, which
provides the basis for venue in most criminal conspiracy
prosecutions. Part V of the Article outlines the constraints on
prosecution control over venue in criminal conspiracy cases,
and the limits of those constraints. Part VI, proposes a new
judicial standard, beyond the mere commission of any overt
act, for determining when motions to transfer venue should
be granted. Part VII is the Article’s brief conclusion.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION’S VENUE PROTECTIONS

A. Constitutional Provisions
The U.S. Constitution addresses venue in two separate
provisions. In Article III, titled “The Judicial Branch,”
Section 2, titled “Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury
Trials,” the relevant clause states that all criminal trials
“shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but where
not committed in any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”11 The
Sixth Amendment, titled “Right to Speedy Trial,
Confrontation of Witnesses,” contains a very similar but not
identical clause: “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”12 As one
leading scholar on venue in criminal cases aptly noted, the
Article III clause is a venue provision (concerning the location
of the trial), while the Sixth Amendment clause is a vicinage
provision (concerning the location of the jury pool).13

11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
13. “The Sixth Amendment preserves one of the oldest institutions of the
common law—the jury of the vicinage. Venue in modern law means the place of
trial. Vicinage means, not the place of trial, but the place from which the jury
must be summoned.” William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal
Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 U. MICH L. REV. 59, 60 (1944).
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Although venue and vicinage are different legal concepts,
modern commentators have noted that “[t]his technical
distinction has been of no real importance.”14 Jurors are
selected from the district in which the trial is held. “The
distinction between the Constitutional venue and vicinage
provisions has all but vanished.”15
The historical background of the Constitution’s venue
provisions is well documented. In 1769, only six years before
the start of the Revolutionary War, the British Parliament
passed a law establishing a special commission to investigate,
try, and adjudicate acts of alleged treason, under which the
accused American colonists would be removed to Great
Britain for prosecution.16 The colonies reacted by passing
resolutions opposing the British law, such as the Virginia
Resolves, and the first Continental Congress in 1774 declared
that the colonists had the right to a jury trial of the vicinage,
or location of the offense.17 Two years later, the Declaration
of Independence denounced King George III “for transporting
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses.”18 “By
insisting on a right to a jury of a vicinage the colonists hoped
to escape the hardship and danger of standing trial in some
distant colony or in England.”19 As Justice Ginsburg observed
in United States v. Cabrales, the framers remembered this
affront to their rights by King George and wrote two separate
provisions relating to the place of trial into the Constitution.20
B. Policy Reasons for Constitutional Venue Protection
The policy reasons for the Constitution’s venue
protections are closely linked to their historical background of
preventing the sovereign from transporting the accused to a
14. 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 301 (4th ed. 2009).
15. Andrew D. Leipold, How The Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1133–34 (2005) (citing United States v.
Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (the difference between
Constitutional venue and vicinage provisions “has never been given any
weight”)).
16. Blume, supra note 13, at 63–64.
17. Id. at 64–66.
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
19. Blume, supra note 13, at 66.
20. United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998) (venue for money
laundering offense conducted entirely in Florida did not lie in Missouri, even if
laundered funds were derived from unlawful Missouri drug sales).
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distant location for trial. In United States v. Cores, the
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution’s “provision for
trial in the vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the
unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is
prosecuted in a remote place.”21 Unfairness and hardships
that can result from being tried in a remote place can include
traveling great distances,22 separation from family and
friends,23 the potential difficulty in securing character
witnesses,24 limitation on the choice of counsel,25 a deleterious
effect on one’s livelihood,26 and being tried in an alien
environment in a tribunal favorable to the prosecution.27 As
noted by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, the object of
these venue provisions is to protect the accused “from being
dragged to a trial in some distant state, away from his
friends, witnesses, and neighborhood; and thus subjected to
the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common
sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or prejudices
against him.”28 Indeed, the Department of Justice itself
recognizes that “prosecution entails profound consequences
for the accused and the family of the accused whether or not a
conviction ultimately results.”29
21. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958).
22. Id. at 410; Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 224 (1956) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949).
23. Johnston, 351 U.S. at 224; United States v. Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 865,
879 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
24. Cores, 356 U.S. at 410. The expense of transplanting character
witnesses to a distant venue is often too great to warrant their use and, even if
used, such witnesses are likely to have limited effectiveness before a foreign
jury. Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
25. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); Radley, 558 F.
Supp. 2d at 882.
26. Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
27. See id. These concerns were also described forcefully in the Virginia
Resolves: “Conveyed to a distant Land, where no Friend, no Relation will
alleviate his Distresses or minister to his Necessities; and where no Witness can
be found to testify his Innocence; shunned by the reputable and honest,
consigned to the Society and Converse of the wretched and abandoned . . . .”
Blume, supra note 13, at 64–65 (capitalizations left for emphasis).
28. United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861–62 (3d Cir. 1997)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 925 (Carolina Academic Press reprint
1987)). Justice Story further noted: “Besides this; a trial in a distant state or
territory might subject a party to the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps even
to the inability of procuring proper witnesses to establish his innocence.” Id.
29. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.001 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL],
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On the other hand, a defendant who travels to a remote
location to commit a crime cannot invoke the Constitution’s
venue protections to preclude trial there. As Judge Winter
noted in United States v. Reed, discussed infra, “all appear to
agree that the place where the acts constituting the crime
occurred is a proper venue.”30 Justice Harlan argued that the
basic policy of the Sixth Amendment would best be served by
trying cases at the location of “witnesses and relevant
circumstances surrounding the contested issues.”31
As Judge Winter observed in Reed, although the concept
of a right to trial in the vicinage was so highly regarded as to
appear twice in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has yet
to articulate a coherent definition of the underlying policies.32
Consequently, courts have been required to balance the
accused’s interest in avoiding prosecution in remote places
with the competing interests of the courts, prosecutors, and
witnesses.
II. HYDE V. UNITED STATES: VENUE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY CASES
A. The Hyde Opinion
The common law of venue in federal criminal conspiracy
cases is based almost entirely on Hyde.33 In that case, the
government alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud
the United States by fraudulently obtaining state lands in
California and Oregon in order to exchange them with the
federal government for more developable lands, which they
planned to sell for a profit.34 The defendants were California
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27
mcrm.htm#9-27.001.
30. United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480–81 (2d Cir. 1985).
31. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
32. Reed, 773 F.2d at 480.
33. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). As Professor Norman
Abrams wrote almost fifty years ago in what was then the seminal article on
this topic: “Any discussion of the extent to which conspiracy venue differs from
venue for other offenses must focus upon [the] rule which was first firmly
established for the federal courts fifty years ago in Hyde v. United States, a
landmark decision which merits careful study.” Norman Abrams, Conspiracy
and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The Crime Committed
Formula, 9 UCLA L. REV. 751, 754 (1962) (citations omitted).
34. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 351–52.
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residents who had never previously set foot in the District of
Columbia where they were tried.35 Two defendants—Hyde,
who was one of the alleged principals in the conspiracy, and
Schneider, who worked for Hyde—were convicted of
conspiring to defraud the United States under then Section
5440 of the Revised Statutes.36
The defendants appealed their convictions based on a
lack of venue in the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court
heard the case to determine whether under the Sixth
Amendment venue in a criminal conspiracy prosecution lies
only where the conspiracy was formed (i.e., the location of the
unlawful agreement), or whether venue may lie at the
location of any overt act.37 On appeal, the government argued
that the defendants “formed” the conspiracy in the District of
Columbia because they committed overt acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy there.38
Neither the venue provision of Article III, Section 2 nor
the vicinage provision of the Sixth Amendment contemplates
that a crime could be committed in more than one
jurisdiction.
Moreover, neither provision explicitly
contemplates conspiracy as an offense.39 Consequently, the
Supreme Court could write essentially on an empty slate in
deciding where venue in a conspiracy case should lie when
the conspiracy was entered into in one district and overt acts
took place in another.40
By a 5–4 margin, the Court held that venue could lie in
either the district where the conspiracy was entered into or
35. Id. at 356–57. Seven years earlier in Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 76
(1905), the same defendants challenged, in a habeas corpus petition, their
removal from California to the District of Columbia. The Court held in a 6-3
decision that the government’s allegation in the indictment that the conspiracy
was entered into in the District of Columbia was sufficient to establish probable
cause. Id. The dissent argued that removal was improper because there was no
probable cause; there was conclusive evidence that the defendants were not
present in the District of Columbia at the time the alleged conspiracy was
formed and thus they could not be guilty of the crime charged. Id. at 98.
36. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 355–56. The two other alleged conspirators were
acquitted. Id.
37. Id. at 357.
38. Id. at 350.
39. Another intriguing facet of the venue and vicinage provisions of Article
III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment is that both provisions assume a crime
has been committed, as opposed to stating that venue lies where the crime or
crimes are alleged to have been committed.
40. Id. at 360.
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any district in which an overt act took place.41 After a review
of the contemporary jurisprudence on conspiracy, the Court
reasoned that while the agreement was the “gist” of the
conspiracy offense, “an overt act was necessary to complete
it.”42 Thus, a conspiracy transcends the time and location of
the agreement and extends to the times and locations of all
the overt acts.43 As the Court viewed it, conspiracy is a
continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any district
where it is begun, continued, or completed.44
In upholding the convictions, the Supreme Court cited
several policy considerations.45 The Court relied foremost on
the need for the effective administration of the criminal
justice system: “We must not, in too great a solicitude for the
criminal, give him a kind of immunity from punishment
because of the difficulty in convicting him—indeed, of even
detecting him.”46 While noting the potential for oppression in
the rule it established, the Court found the countervailing
considerations more compelling: “It is not an oppression in
the law to accept the place where an unlawful purpose is
attempted to be executed as the place of punishment, and
rather conspirators be taken from their homes than the
victims and witnesses of the conspiracy be taken from

41. Id. at 357, 363.
42. Id. at 359.
43. The Court explained:
We have held that a conspiracy is not necessarily the conception and
purpose of the moment, but may be continuing. If so in time, it may be
in place, carrying to the whole area of its operations the guilt of its
conception and that which follows guilt, trial and punishment. As we
have pointed out, the statute states what in addition to the agreement
is necessary to complete the measure of the offense. The guilty
purpose must be put into a guilty act.
Id. at 363.
44. Id. at 360.
45. Id. at 363–64.
46. Id. at 363. According to the Court, a rule requiring the government to
prove the location where agreement took place would unnecessarily hinder law
enforcement. Determining the geographic location of a meeting of the minds
may often be a difficult and ambiguous proposition.
Id. at 361–62.
Furthermore, a criminal could potentially avoid prosecution for conspiracy by
effectively concealing the location of the agreement. Id. at 363. The Court
stated that its decision “cuts through such puzzles and makes the act of the
conspirator, which necessarily has a definite place without the aid of
presumption or fiction, the legal inception of guilt, inculpating all and
subjecting all to punishment.” Id. at 362.

ULLMANN FINAL

1012

3/13/2012 4:03 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

theirs.”47 In the Court’s view, the Hyde rule was entirely
consistent with constitutional venue requirements—that the
crime be prosecuted in the district where it was committed.48
B. Criticism of Hyde by Justice Holmes and Justice Jackson
The critique of expansive venue in criminal conspiracy
cases begins with the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in
Hyde.49 Speaking for four of the nine justices, Holmes
categorically rejected the majority’s opinion. He argued that
while an overt act by any co-conspirator in any jurisdiction
might suffice to expand the liability of all co-conspirators, this
concept did not compel the majority’s holding that venue was
proper wherever any co-conspirator had committed an overt
act. As Holmes explained, “[I]t does not follow that an overt
act draws the conspiracy to wherever such overt act may be
done, and whether it does so or not is the question before us
now.”50
Justice Holmes then argued that as the boundaries of the
United States expanded, the importance of the Constitution’s
venue protections correspondingly increased:
With the country extending from ocean to ocean, this
[venue] requirement is even more important now than it
was a hundred years ago, and must be enforced in letter
and spirit if we are to make impossible hardships
amounting to grevious [sic] wrongs. In the case of
conspiracy the danger is conspicuously brought out. Every
overt act done in aid of it, of course, is attributed to the
conspirators; and if that means that the conspiracy is
present as such wherever any overt act is done, it might
be at the choice of the government to prosecute in any one
of twenty states in none of which the conspirators had

47. Id. at 363. The companion case to Hyde, Brown v. Elliott, in deciding a
similar venue challenge to a conspiracy conviction, added: “The Constitution of
the United States is not intended as a facility for crime. It is intended to
prevent oppression, and its letter and its spirit are satisfied if where a criminal
purpose is executed the criminal purpose be punished.” Brown v. Elliot, 225
U.S. 392, 402 (1912).
48. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 363.
49. Id. at 384–91.
50. Id. at 385. In making that statement, Holmes assumed “so far as the
statute of limitations is concerned, an overt act done anywhere with the express
or implied consent of conspirators would show the conspiracy to be continuing
between the parties so consenting, and leave them open to prosecution for three
years from that date.” Id.
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been. And as wherever two or more have united for the
commission of a crime there is a conspiracy, the opening to
oppression thus made is very wide indeed.51

In Holmes’ view the majority’s ruling was “an amazing
extension of even the broadest form of fiction.”52
Although Justice Holmes’ dissent was forcefully argued,
it had little or no effect. Nearly forty years after Holmes’
dissent in Hyde, Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion
that sharply criticized prosecutors for ignoring defendants’
constitutional venue protections. Jackson’s concurrence in
Krulewitch v. United States described conspiracy as an
“elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense . . . [that] constitutes
a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice.”53
Jackson did not limit his critique to venue, but the remarks
on venue were among his most pointed.
An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right to
trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The
leverage of a conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from
the prosecution and reduces its protection to a phantom,
for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been
committed in any district where any one of the
conspirators did any one of the acts, however innocent,
intended to accomplish its object. The Government may,
and often does, compel one to defend at a great distance
from any place he ever did any act because some accused
confederate did some trivial and by itself innocent act in
the chosen district.54

Jackson went on to describe an extreme example:
“Circumstances may even enable the prosecution to fix the
place of trial in Washington, D.C., where a defendant may
lawfully be put to trial before a jury partly or even wholly

51. Id. at 386–87.
52. Id. at 389. Justice Holmes went on to posit what he saw as an extreme
example of the potential for government abuse of expansive venue in criminal
conspiracy cases where “an otherwise innocent overt act done in one state drew
to itself a conspiracy in another state to defraud people in the latter, even
though the first state would punish a conspiracy to commit a fraud beyond its
own boundaries.” Id.
53. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Justice Jackson was particularly concerned with a prosecutor’s
tendency to indict for conspiracy in lieu of a substantive offense. Id.
54. Id. at 452–53.
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made up of employees of the Government that accuses him.”55
Justice Jackson’s concern about prosecutors fixing the place
of trial in Washington, D.C., hardly is academic. As noted
below, venue for the offense of gathering, transmitting, or
losing defense information is always authorized in the
District of Columbia regardless of where the relevant conduct
occurred.56
In their attacks on expansive venue in criminal
conspiracy cases, both Justice Holmes in Hyde and Justice
Jackson in Krulewitch focused on the prosecution’s power to
force a defendant to stand trial in a “remote” location, in
seeming disregard of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
be tried by a jury of “the State and district where the crime
shall have been committed.” As the Justices noted, the
consequences of this power include both personal hardship to
the defendant57 and the prosecution’s ability to choose the
venire.58
Writing in 1962—50 years after Hyde, eighteen years
after the enactment of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
(“Rule”) 21(b),59 and thirteen years after Krulewitch—
Professor Abrams stated: “The tendency [in conspiracy cases]
has been to dispose of objections to venue based on overt acts
alone by citation of Hyde.”60 Indeed, after a thorough
examination of the relevant precedent, Abrams concluded
that the concerns of the four dissenters in Hyde had gone
virtually unnoticed.61 A more recent scholarly work noted the
heightened potential for prosecutorial abuse in decisions
about where to bring criminal conspiracy cases.62

55. Id.
56. See infra note 90.
57. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 386 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. See Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
59. FED. R. CRIM P. 21(b). See infra Part IV.B (gives courts the power under
certain circumstances to transfer venue on motion of the defendant).
60. Abrams, supra note 33, at 759.
61. Id. at 759–60.
62. “The risks of a defendant [in a conspiracy prosecution] being tried in a
remote location are greater than in most cases, since venue in a conspiracy
prosecution can be laid in any district in which any conspirator performed any
of the overt acts to accomplish its object.” WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, §
226 (citing Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 218 (2005)). These risks
are compounded by the usual risk of prejudice from joining many defendants in
one case. Id.
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There does not appear to be any federal statute that
places greater constraints on prosecutors’ ability to select
venue in any criminal conspiracy case than the test set forth
in Hyde. As discussed in the next two sections of this Article,
the expansion in recent decades of what can constitute an
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy, when combined with
this lack of constraints, has given prosecutors enormous
control over the selection of venue in criminal conspiracy
cases.
III. EXPANSION OF WHAT CAN CONSTITUTE AN OVERT ACT IN
FURTHERANCE OF A CONSPIRACY
Over the past several decades, a series of federal appeals
court rulings has expanded the scope of what can constitute
an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. These rulings
often arose in the context of whether an element of the
offense had been satisfied, or whether a statute of limitations
defense was applicable. When they arose in the context of a
venue challenge, they were frequently disposed with brief
citation to Article III, the Sixth Amendment, and Hyde. One
effect of the convergence of these rulings is that conspiracy
prosecutions have been allowed to proceed in districts that
have essentially no connection to the charged conduct.
It has been established, for example, that the overt act
providing the basis for venue in a federal criminal case need
not have been committed by the defendant63 or any codefendant at trial.64 Venue is also proper in any district in
which an overt act occurs, even if the commission of an overt
act is not an element of the offense.65 The conspirator who
committed the overt act need not even be named in the
indictment.66 Nor does the defendant need to know “where
. . . or if . . . the overt act was committed.”67 Indeed, it need
not even be foreseeable that an overt act would be committed
63. E.g., United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2000); United
States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1997). See also WRIGHT &
HENNING, supra note 14, § 303 (citing Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 94 and Angotti,
105 F.3d at 545).
64. See United States v. Molt, 772 F.2d 366, 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
65. See Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 218 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 252 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 402–04 (1927)).
66. Angotti, 105 F.3d at 545.
67. Id.
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in the district where the charges were brought.68
It has also become accepted law that lawful conduct or
“trivial”69 acts can constitute an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy.70 Thus, the fact that a co-conspirator drove
through the district,71 or placed a phone call to someone in the
district72 will suffice to establish venue there. Flying over a
judicial district in the course of the conspiracy will suffice to
establish venue there.73 Indeed, the fact that an airplane
flying over the district was occupied solely by government
agents does not defeat venue, unless “there [is] an indication
that its route had been significantly out of the ordinary
. . . .”74
When more than one of the above circumstances appears,
the venue for a federal conspiracy prosecution can have
almost no connection to either the defendant or the alleged
unlawful conduct. In United States v. Shearer, a drug
conspiracy case, a cooperating witness testified that a coconspirator told him that electronics for a boat to be used to
smuggle marijuana had been driven to New Orleans from a
location near Miami.75 There was also testimony that another
non-testifying co-conspirator had flown from Miami to New
Orleans, and that the flight path would necessarily pass over
the Middle District of Florida.76 There was no evidence that
Shearer was present at any time in the Middle District of
Florida.77 On that record, the Eleventh Circuit held that
venue in that district was proper. The court noted that all
prior cases finding venue based on flights passing over a
district involved the pick-up or delivery of contraband.78
Nonetheless, the court held that the government established
venue, because it required only proof by a preponderance of
the evidence that an overt act in furtherance on the
68. Id. (citing United States v. Tannenbaum, 934 F.2d 8, 12–13 (2d Cir.
1990)).
69. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452–53.
70. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States, 275 F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1960) (“an
overt act in itself may be a perfectly innocent act standing by itself”).
71. United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986).
72. United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (cases cited).
73. United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1976).
74. United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1987).
75. Shearer, 794 F.2d at 1550.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1546–50.
78. See id. at 1551.
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conspiracy had been performed in the district where the case
was prosecuted.79
All of the above-noted cases expanding the scope of what
can constitute an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy
post-date the Hyde decision. Many of them were decided in
contexts other than a challenge to venue, such as whether the
charge was time-barred by a statute of limitation. This
precedent enables prosecutors to bring criminal cases in
jurisdictions that have only the most tenuous connection to
the defendant or the charged criminal conduct.
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON PROSECUTION CONTROL OVER VENUE IN
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES, AND THE LIMITS OF THOSE
CONSTRAINTS
At least two legal checks exist on federal prosecutors who
might seek to bring conspiracy cases in districts far from the
site of a defendant’s alleged conduct. First, to the extent that
a defendant simultaneously faces conspiracy and substantive
charges, venue must lie for both offenses.80 Second, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) gives courts discretion to
grant a defendant’s change-of-venue motion “in the interest of
justice.” However, both of these legal checks have significant
limitations. In theory, the Justice Department could impose
additional limits on prosecutors who seek to bring charges in
districts removed from defendants’ conduct, but current policy
imposes no such limits.
A. Joint Trial of Conspiracy and Substantive Charges
Venue must lie for both the conspiracy charge and the
substantive offense when both are tried together.81 However,
this legal check has limited benefit to defendants, for at least
three reasons. First, venue for many substantive offenses is
itself expansive.
For example, there are many federal
criminal statutes that prohibit “use of the mails” in

79. See id.
80. See Leipold, supra note 15, at 1136 (citing United States v. Corona, 34
F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that proper venue for conspiracy and the
underlying substantive crime is the location of the substantive crime); United
States v. Walden, 464 F.2d 1015, 1020 (4th Cir. 1972) (“trial ought to be held at
the place of commission of the substantive offense”)).
81. See Corona, 34 F.3d at 881.
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connection with various activities.82 The phrase “use of the
mails” has been interpreted to include any location where the
item mailed was sent, received or traveled through during the
mailing process.83 Perhaps more relevant today, wire fraud
offenses are similarly broad.84 Racketeering offenses under
18 U.S.C. § 1959 are also subject to very broad venue,
prosecution being proper anywhere the racketeering
enterprise has significant operations.85 And, not surprisingly,
drug distribution offenses have been subject to very broad
venue, including locations where the drug activity could have
an effect.86
Second, prosecutors frequently bring conspiracy charges
without adding a substantive offense. A review of the 2008
statistics from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center
indicates that federal prosecutors brought 15,297 conspiracy
charges against defendants in 2008 under 21 U.S.C. § 846,
the drug manufacturing and distribution conspiracy statute,
while the combined number of substantive charges brought
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 was 9282.87 These statistics suggest
that at least 6015 drug defendants indicted in 2007, and
probably a significantly higher number, were charged only
with conspiracy.88 It should be noted here that the two most

82. These include the distribution of obscene or crime-inciting materials (18
U.S.C. § 1717 (2011)), certain sexually oriented materials (18 U.S.C. § 1735
(2011)), and materials that incite a riot (18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2011)). United States
v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. Brennan, 183 F.3d at 147.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2011).
85. See United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cabranes,
J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 419 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2005)
(prosecuting defendant for distribution of marijuana in Minnesota even though
he was arrested for attempting to sell drugs in California); United States v.
Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (subjecting Dallas residing
defendant to Tennessee venue because the drugs sold were intended for
Tennessee).
87. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Federal Criminal Case Processing
Statistics, http://fjsrc.urban.org/ (data downloaded March 19, 2009). In 2007,
14,770 defendants were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, whereas 10,220
defendants were charged under § 841, suggesting that, in 2007, at least 4550
defendants were charged only with conspiracy. Id. In 2006, 15,208 defendants
were charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, whereas 10,409 defendants were charged
under § 841, suggesting that, in 2006, at least 4800 defendants were charged
only with conspiracy. Id.
88. For each defendant who was charged with more than one substantive
offense, the total number of defendants charged with one or more substantive
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widely used criminal conspiracy statutes do not have separate
venue provisions.89 At least two federal conspiracy statutes
do have separate venue provisions, and in both cases
Congress has expanded venue beyond the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Hyde.90 There does not appear to be any federal
statute that places greater constraints on the prosecutor’s
ability to select venue in any criminal conspiracy case than
the test set forth in Hyde.
Third, in multi-defendant cases, prosecutors can
nonetheless bring some substantive charges by limiting them
to defendants whose alleged substantive crimes occurred in
the district of trial. For example, in United States v.
MacKenzie, the government charged four executives and eight
lower-level managers of a pharmaceutical company with
violating the general conspiracy statute.91 Although the
company had its headquarters in Illinois and many
defendants never worked in Massachusetts, the case was
brought in the District of Massachusetts, the home office of
the prosecutors who investigated the case. Prosecuting the
case in Massachusetts led to the somewhat anomalous result
that only two sales managers (who worked in Massachusetts)
were charged with substantive offenses, while the four
executives and six other sales managers faced no substantive
charges.92

offenses decreases further below 9282. Id.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2011) (general conspiracy statue); 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2011) (drug manufacture and distribution conspiracy statute).
90. The federal money laundering statute contains a venue provision which
provides that: “A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under this
section or section 1957 may be brought in the district where venue would lie for
the completed offense under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act
in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2)
(2011). Similarly, venue for espionage begun or committed outside the United
States, including conspiracy offenses, may always be brought in the District of
Columbia, as well as “in any other district authorized by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3239
(2011) (establishing venue for 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794 offenses); 18 U.S.C. §
793(g) (2011) (“[g]athering, transmitting or losing defense information”); 18
U.S.C. 794(c) (2011) (“[g]athering or delivering defense information to aid
foreign government”).
91. Superseding Indictment at 3–5, 21–22, United States v. MacKenzie, No.
01-CR-10350-DPW (D. Mass. July 16, 2002). Author represented one of the
sales manager defendants.
92. See id. at 21–22, 69–85. Ultimately, all twelve of these defendants were
either acquitted or the charges against them were dismissed. Verdicts, United
States v. MacKenzie, No. 01-CR-10350-DPW (D. Mass. July 14, 2004).
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The above-described factors explain why existing venue
provisions for substantive offenses place only limited
constraints on the power of federal prosecutors to choose
venue for criminal conspiracy cases. In theory, Rule 21(b),
discussed in the next section, should provide significant
constraints on the exercise of this power. In practice, judges
have decreased their use of Rule 21(b) at the same time that
prosecution control over venue has increased through the
expanded definition of “overt act” discussed above in Part IV
of this Article.
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), approved by
Congress in 1944, gives judges the power to transfer cases
“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the
interest of justice,” upon motion of the defendant.93 When
applied in conjunction with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 14, which allows for severance of defendants in
multi-defendant cases, Rule 21(b) allows the court to transfer
a particular defendant’s case to a more appropriate venue.94
In the initial decades after Rule 21(b) was adopted,
courts frequently granted transfers of criminal cases under
the rule, even when the transfer resulted in a severance of
defendants and therefore more than one trial.95 Most of these

93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b).
94. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).
95. See, e.g., United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951)
(venue transferred from Nebraska to Oklahoma, because, inter alia, defendant
was “quite certainly a man of modest means” and a Nebraska trial “would
involve him in vastly greater expense than he would incur in a trial in
Oklahoma”); United States v. Amador Casanas, 233 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D.D.C.
1964) (transferring wire fraud counts from D.C. to Puerto Rico, where
defendants resided, and removing non-transferable counts from court’s calendar
until transferred counts were disposed of); United States v. Jessup, 38 F.R.D.
42, 50 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (transferring charges against two defendants from
Tennessee to Mississippi, where those defendants resided, even though result
would be separate trial against third defendant); United States v. Aronoff, 463
F. Supp. 454, 460–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (transferring conspiracy and other
charges against two defendants from New York to Michigan, where these
defendants resided, despite government argument that result would be an
additional multi-week trial); United States v. Haley, 504 F. Supp. 1124, 1129
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (transferring RICO conspiracy and other charges against seven
indigent defendants from Pennsylvania to Georgia, where they resided, based
primarily on “economic hardship accruing to defendants by virtue of attending a
lengthy trial far from home”); United States v. Daewoo Indus. Co., 591 F. Supp.
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decisions relied heavily on the financial, emotional, and
practical hardship to the defendants of facing trial far from
In recent decades, however, Rule 21(b)
their homes.96
motions have almost always been denied.97 One federal court
has noted “a trend in recent years away from granting
transfers to mitigate the financial, emotional, or practical
burdens of trial in a distant locale . . . . [T]he Court’s own
research supports the observation that transfer under Rule
21(b), although not unheard of, has been rare in recent
years.”98 Citing Professor Wright, the court identified one of
the rare exceptions being a 1990 case from the Western
District of Washington where one of the major considerations
supporting transfer was a possible volcanic eruption in
Alaska.99
In analyzing Rule 21(b) motions, courts typically cite
Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., in which the Supreme
Court noted but did not specifically endorse a ten-factor
test100 that had been applied by the district court.101 This ten-

157, 165 (D. Ore. 1984) (transferring conspiracy and other charges from Oregon
to California, finding that “[t]o try this case in unfamiliar jurisdiction with a
very small Korean population, far away from family and friends who could
provide financial and emotional support would exacerbate needlessly the fears
and alienation that the defendants may feel”).
96. See United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D.D.C. 2005); cases
cited infra note 98.
97. See WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, § 344. An analysis of the
reasons for this decline is beyond the scope of this Article; greater ease and
declining cost of travel have been cited as two factors. See infra note 98.
98. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86 (footnotes omitted). The court noted
that “the trend in recent years was hardly surprising when one considers the
massive expansion of technology and the relative decline in costs for longdistance travel over the past few decades.” Id. at 86. Certainly for defendants,
such as actor Wesley Snipes, who filed “requests to travel out of the country for
lengthy periods of time” while his trial was pending, arguments as to the
burden of being tried far from home “ring hollow.” United States v. Snipes, No.
5:06-cr-22, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65432 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2007).
99. Id. (citing WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 14, § 344 n.29). For a few
more recent examples of Rule 21(b) transfers, see Radley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 865,
870 (2008); United States v. Ferguson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (E.D. Va. 2006);
United States v. Lima, No. 94-800, 1995 WL 348105, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 1,
1995).
100. The ten factors include:
(1) [L]ocation of corporate defendant; (2) location of possible witnesses;
(3) location of events likely to be in issue; (4) location of documents and
records likely to be involved; (5) disruption of defendant’s business
unless the case is transferred; (6) expense to the parties; (7) location of
counsel; (8) relative accessibility of place of trial; (9) docket condition of
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factor test applied by the district court has been widely
adopted.102 However, as Judge Posner has noted, the “openended character of the standard in Rule 21(b) for a change of
venue” gives the district courts essentially unbridled
discretion.103
Courts impose a relatively high burden on defendants
who seek Rule 21(b) changes of venue. In order to prevail in a
Rule 21(b) motion, a “defendant carries the burden of showing
substantial balance of inconvenience to warrant finding a
transfer would be in the interests of justice.”104
There are also significant pragmatic limitations on a
defendant’s willingness to bring a Rule 21(b) motion. In most
instances a defendant who has been charged with a federal
crime will want an attorney who practices frequently in the
jurisdiction where the charge has been brought. Also, for any
defendant who cannot afford counsel, appointed counsel will
almost always practice primarily or exclusively in the district

each district or division involved; (10) any other special elements which
might affect the transfer.
Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1964).
101. Indeed, the issue decided by the Court in Platt was not the standard for
transfers under Rule 21(b), but whether the Court of Appeals had authority to
order a transfer or was limited to “determin[ing] the appropriate criteria” for
transfer and “leav[ing] their application to the trial court on remand.” Id. at
244–45. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have
authority to order a transfer of venue. Id. at 245.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007); In
re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 387–88 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jordan,
223 F.3d 676, 685 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d
934, 966 (2d Cir. 1990).
103. This is one of those areas in which the question for the court of appeals
is whether,
[T]he discretion granted to the district court has been exercised. If it
has been, it will be almost impossible to show that it has been abused–
let alone abused to such a degree as to meet the very high standard for
review by means of the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
104. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 533 (citing United States v. Benjamin, 623 F. Supp. 623
(D.D.C. 1985)), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading
_room/usam/title9/crm00533.htm; United States v. Oster, 580 F. Supp. 599
(S.D. W. Va. 1984); United States v. Baltimore and O.R.R., 538 F. Supp. 200
(D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Jones, 43 F.R.D. 511 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub
nom. Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1968). However, for a recent example of a conspiracy case in which defendants’
Rule 21(b) motion was granted, see United States v. Auffenberg, No. 07-30042MJR (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2007) (Memorandum and Order).
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where the case was brought. Once the defendant has
developed a working relationship with his or her attorney,
transferring the case to a distant location would typically
present significant obstacles to counsel, though it might be
closer to where the defendant, the defendant’s family and
most of the key witnesses reside. Had the case initially been
brought in a jurisdiction with which the defendant had more
contact, this difficult choice would not be necessary.
The decreasing reluctance of judges to grant Rule 21(b)
motions, the virtually unbridled discretion inherent in the
prevailing test for assessing such motions and the practical
problems for a defendant in changing venue once the case has
been brought all explain why Rule 21(b) has placed few
constraints on the ability of prosecutors to select venue in
criminal conspiracy cases.
C. Justice Department Policy
The U.S. Justice Department places various non-legally
binding constraints on the exercise of prosecutorial power
through the Principles of Federal Prosecution (“PFP”). These
principles “provide to Federal prosecutors a statement of
sound prosecutorial policies and practices for particularly
important areas of their work.”105 To the extent that the PFP
addresses selection of venue in criminal cases, in essence it
places no weight on a defendant’s constitutional venue
protections.
Venue is addressed in the section of the PFP titled
“Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution in Another
Jurisdiction.”106 The PFP identifies three factors to be
considered in selecting a jurisdiction when a criminal case
may be prosecuted in more than one jurisdiction, as follows:
(1) strength of the jurisdiction’s interest in the case; (2) ability
and willingness of prosecutors in the jurisdiction to prosecute
effectively; and (3) the probable sentence upon conviction.107
Protection of the accused’s constitutional venue rights is not
mentioned in this discussion.
Additional guidance for federal prosecutors can be found
in the Justice Department’s Criminal Resource Manual. The

105. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 29.
106. Id. at 9-27.240.
107. Id.
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Criminal Resource Manual notes that “[i]nitial choice of
venue is up to the prosecution,”108 and further states, “A
defendant must demonstrate substantial inconvenience to
nullify this prosecutive prerogative . . . .”109 This guidance,
like the Principles of Federal Prosecution, does not suggest to
prosecutors that they consider the defendant’s venue rights in
deciding where to bring criminal charges. It is therefore not
surprising that federal prosecutors frequently bring
conspiracy cases in jurisdictions that have only the most
tenuous connection to the defendants who are being charged.
V. ENHANCING CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE PROTECTIONS IN
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES: A PROPOSED NEW JUDICIAL
STANDARD
The common law of what constitutes an overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy has expanded to the point where
almost any conduct in a judicial district, no matter how trivial
or removed from the defendants on trial, can provide a basis
for venue in that district. Moreover, the most commonly used
legal standard for assessing motions to transfer venue under
Rule 21(b) is an essentially standard-less ten factor test that
gives short shrift to a defendant’s constitutional rights.
A century after Hyde, the time has come to adopt a new
legal standard that gives defendants’ venue rights more
standing. Courts should apply a presumption in favor of
transferring cases under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
21(b) in conspiracy cases that lack some modicum of
connection between the charged conduct and the district of
prosecution, beyond the mere commission of any overt act by
an alleged conspirator. Such a standard would be preferable
to the current ten-factor test of Platt, which in essence
provides little more than a completely malleable totality of
the circumstances analysis.
Precedent that could support an alternate standard to
the Platt test in criminal conspiracy cases has already been
developed in several circuits in the context of venue for
substantive offenses.
Three circuits have applied a

108. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 531 (citations omitted), available at http://www.justice
.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00531.htm.
109. Id.
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“substantial contacts” test to determine where venue is
proper for certain substantive offenses and two other circuits
have noted this standard with at least some apparent
approval.110 The definition of what constitutes “substantial
contacts” has certainly not been onerous for prosecutors.
Indeed, the standard has at times been used to expand venue.
The “substantial contacts” test therefore holds promise for
creating a threshold for venue in conspiracy cases higher than
the “any overt act” rule of Hyde without unduly burdening
multi-district prosecutions.
The requirement that a substantive offense must have
“substantial contacts” with a district for venue to lie there
first appeared in 1985 with the Second Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Reed.111 The prosecution in Reed involved
deposition testimony taken in San Francisco pursuant to a
civil action in the Southern District of New York.112 The
defendant was indicted in the Southern District of New York
for perjury and obstruction of justice for making false
statements and offering fabricated documents.113
These
counts were dismissed by the trial court for improper venue
on the grounds that perjury could only be prosecuted where
the oath was taken and that obstruction of justice could only
be prosecuted where the acts constituting the obstruction
occurred.114
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court,
finding that venue was indeed proper in the Southern District
of New York. Before addressing the facts of the case, the
Court engaged in a review of the constitutional policy of
venue, noting: “The Constitution requires only that the venue
chosen be determined from the nature of the crime charged as
well as from the location of the act or acts constituting it, and
that it not be contrary to an explicit policy underlying
venue.”115 The Court also recognized that the Constitution
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, the basic venue
provision in the federal criminal rules, “are often of precious
little aid in explaining how the locus of a crime is to be
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See infra notes 121–23.
United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 480.
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determined.”116 Responding to this lack of any “single defined
policy or mechanical test to determine constitutional
venue,”117 the court in Reed adopted what it called a
“substantial contacts” test to determine constitutional
venue.118 The substantial contacts test considers: (1) the site
of the defendant’s acts, (2) the elements and nature of the
crime, (3) the place where the effect of the conduct occurs, and
(4) the suitability of the district for accurate fact-finding.119
The latter three factors “often give sites other than where the
act occurred equal standing so far as venue is concerned.”120
The Second Circuit subsequently applied the Reed substantial
contacts test in United States v. Saavedra to determine the
outer bounds of venue for offenses that are subject to venue in
multiple districts.121
Four Circuits have expressly adopted or cited with
apparent approval the substantial contacts test set forth in
Reed for determining where venue can lie for a substantive
offense.122 The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only appeals
court to have referenced the substantial contacts test in a
criminal conspiracy case, reversing a drug conspiracy
conviction on venue grounds.123 However, the reference to
substantial contacts was dicta in that no agreement or overt
act occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, where the
defendant was indicted. All of the relevant conduct and the

116. Id. at 479–80.
117. Id. at 481.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2000).
122. See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987)
(affirming venue in a wire fraud case in a district where the defendant was
incarcerated when the plaintiff executed the scheme from prison even though no
wires were used in that district); United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th
Cir. 1993) (affirming venue in Virginia for a witness retaliation conviction
where the assault occurred in the District of Columbia but the case in which the
victim previously testified was located in Virginia); United States v. Williams,
788 F.2d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding venue proper in a bail jumping
case, both in the district where bail was granted and where the defendant failed
to appear); United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2007)
(affirming venue in Wisconsin in attempted drug distribution case where the
defendant purchased drugs in Arizona for resale in Wisconsin, but was arrested
in Oklahoma while transporting the drugs).
123. United States v. Williams, 274 F.3d 1079, 1080 (6th Cir. 2001).
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unlawful agreement occurred in Texas.124 Indeed, the only
connection between the offense and Michigan was the
statement of an undercover agent to the defendant that he
intended to sell the drugs there.125
From the defense perspective, applying the substantial
contacts test to criminal conspiracy cases under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 21(b) could significantly enhance the
venue rights of defendants facing conspiracy charges. From
the government’s perspective, however, requiring the
prosecution to establish substantial contacts between the
alleged conspiracy and the district of prosecution poses at
least two potential obstacles to effective law enforcement.
The first potential concern for federal prosecutors arises
from the fact that many large conspiracy cases begin with the
discovery of relatively minor criminal conduct. For example,
the arrest of a street-level drug dealer carrying a small
quantity of cocaine may ultimately lead to a multidistrict or
even international drug distribution conspiracy case. If the
prosecutors and agents who handled the initial arrest and
patiently assembled a complex case were precluded from
prosecuting the case in their home district, based on a judicial
finding that the district lacked “substantial contacts” with the
overall conspiracy, the result could well be added government
expense and a less effective prosecution effort.
The second potential obstacle for prosecutors arises from
the vagueness of a substantial-contacts standard.
Prosecutors may have trouble proving that a particular overt
act occurred, but they have no difficulty understanding the
concept. In contrast, a prosecutor could find it difficult to
determine whether one or more overt acts constituted
“substantial” contacts.
Judging from the lack of legal challenges or expressions
of prosecutor opposition to the substantial contacts test in
substantive cases, neither of these potential problems should
present a real obstacle to the government if courts define
substantial contacts in conspiracy cases the way they have
defined the term in substantive cases. Moreover, even in the
absence of a showing of substantial contacts by the
prosecution, courts could allow the presumption in favor of

124. Id. at 1084.
125. Id.
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transfer to be rebutted by other compelling circumstances.
A common-sense application of the substantial contacts
test to criminal conspiracy cases would make little or no dent
in the Justice Department’s ability to effectively prosecute
multi-district conspiracies. Indeed, a strong argument exists
that federal prosecutions should already be giving at least
some formal credence to defendants’ venue rights, something
that current Department policy does not consider.126 Surely
defendants should receive greater protection than the current
overt act test provides, given how the common law definition
of overt acts has developed.
CONCLUSION
The century-old holding in Hyde, that venue in criminal
conspiracy cases lies in any district in which one or more
overt acts occurred, has greatly facilitated the prosecution of
complex and geographically diverse conspiracies. However, it
has also subjected many defendants to prosecution in districts
that have little or no connection to their alleged conduct, the
conduct of their alleged co-conspirators, or their place of
residence. Protection of the defendant’s constitutional venue
rights seems to have fallen between the cracks in some
federal criminal cases. Indeed, one goal of this Article has
been to remind not only prosecutors but also defense
attorneys that venue rights are of constitutional magnitude
and should not be regarded merely as some pro forma hurdle
that the prosecution inevitability will surmount.
A century after Hyde, the time has come to establish a
presumption in favor of transferring venue under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b) in conspiracy cases where
the government fails to establish some modicum of connection
between the charged conduct and the district of prosecution,
beyond the mere commission of one overt act by any

126. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL
9-27.240
(2002),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm.
The relevant PFP section, titled Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution
in Another Jurisdiction, should be amended to require that prosecutors to
consider the defendant’s constitutional venue rights in additional to the three
currently noted factors. See id. This simple change would help ensure that
prosecutors give some consideration to each defendant’s venue rights in
criminal conspiracy cases.
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coconspirator. This evolution of the common law would
enhance protection of defendants’ constitutional venue rights
without impeding the effective administration of justice.

